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Abstract—Mobile network operators can track subscribers via
passive or active monitoring of device locations. The recorded
trajectories offer an unprecedented outlook on the activities of
large user populations, which enables developing new networking
solutions and services, and scaling up studies across research
disciplines. Yet, the disclosure of individual trajectories raises
significant privacy concerns: thus, these data are often protected
by restrictive non-disclosure agreements that limit their avail-
ability and impede potential usages. In this paper, we contribute
to the development of technical solutions to the problem of
privacy-preserving publishing of spatiotemporal trajectories of
mobile subscribers. We propose an algorithm that generalizes
the data so that they satisfy kτ,ǫ-anonymity, an original privacy
criterion that thwarts attacks on trajectories. Evaluations with
real-world datasets demonstrate that our algorithm attains its
objective while retaining a substantial level of accuracy in the
data. Our work is a step forward in the direction of open, privacy-
preserving datasets of spatiotemporal trajectories.
I. INTRODUCTION
Subscriber trajectory datasets collected by network opera-
tors are logs of timestamped, georeferenced events associated
to the communication activities of individuals. The analysis
of these datasets allows inferring fine-grained information
about the movements, habits and undertakings of vast user
populations. This has many different applications, encompass-
ing both business and research. For instance, trajectory data
can be used to devise novel data-driven network optimization
techniques [1] or support content delivery operations at the
network edge [2]. They can also be monetized via added-
value services such as transport analytics [3] or location-
based marketing [4]. Additionally, the relevance of massive
movement data from mobile subscribers is critical in research
disciplines such as physics, sociology or epidemiology [5].
The importance of trajectory data has also been recognized
in the design of future 5G networks, with a thrust towards the
introduction of data interfaces among network operators and
over-the-top (OTT) providers to give them online access to this
(and other) data. OTTs can leverage such interfaces to auto-
matically retrieve the data and process them on the fly, thus
enabling new applications such as intelligent transportation [6]
or assisted-life services [7].
All these use cases stem from the disclosure of trajectory
datasets to third parties. However, the open release of such
data is still largely withhold, which hinders potential usages
and applications. A major barrier in this sense are privacy con-
cerns: data circulation exposes it to re-identification attacks,
and cognition of the movement patterns of de-anonymized
individuals may reveal sensitive information about them.
This calls for anonymization techniques. The common prac-
tice operators adhere to is replacing personal identifiers (e.g.,
name, phone number, IMSI) with pseudo-identifiers (i.e., ran-
dom or non-reversible hash values). Whether this is a sufficient
measure is often called into question, especially in relation to
the possibility of tracking user movements. What is sure is that
pseudo-identifiers have been repeatedly proven not to protect
against user trajectory uniqueness, i.e., the fact that mobile
subscribers have distinctive travel patterns that make them
univocally recognizable even in very large populations [8]–
[10]. Uniqueness is not a privacy threat per-se, but it is a
vulnerability that can lead to re-identification. Examples are
brought forth by recent attempts at cross-correlating mobile
operator-collected trajectories with georeferenced check-ins of
Flickr and Twitter users [11], with credit card records [12] or
with Yelp, Google Places and Facebook metadata [13].
More dependable anonymization solutions are needed. How-
ever, the strategies devised to date for relational databases,
location-based services, or regularly sampled (e.g., GPS) mo-
bility do not suit the irregular sampling, time sparsity, and
long duration of trajectories collected by mobile operators.
Moreover, current privacy criteria, including k-anonymity and
differential privacy, do not provide sufficient protection or are
impractical in this context. See Sec. V for a detailed discussion.
In this paper, we put forward several contributions towards
privacy-preserving data publishing (PPDP) of mobile sub-
scriber trajectories. Our contributions are as follows: (i) we
outline attacks that are especially relevant to datasets of
spatiotemporal trajectories; (ii) we introduce kτ,ǫ-anonymity,
a novel privacy criterion that effectively copes with the most
threatening attacks above; (iii) we develop k-merge, an algo-
rithm that solves a fundamental problem in the anonymization
of spatiotemporal trajectories, i.e., effective generalization;
(iv) we implement kte-hide, a practical solution based
on k-merge that attains kτ,ǫ-anonymity in spatiotemporal
trajectory data; (v) we evaluate our approach on real-world
datasets, showing that it achieves its objectives while retaining
a substantial level of accuracy in the anonymized data.
II. REQUIREMENTS AND MODELS
We first present the requirements of PPDP, in Sec. II-A, and
formalize the specific attacker model we consider, in Sec. II-B.
We then propose a consistent privacy model, in Sec. II-C.
A. PPDP requirements
PPDP is defined as the development of methods for the
publication of information that allows meaningful knowledge
discovery, and yet preserves the privacy of monitored sub-
jects [14]. The requisites of PPDP are similar for all types
of databases, including our specific case, i.e., datasets of
spatiotemporal trajectories. They are as follows.
1. The non-expert data publisher. Mining of the data is
performed by the data recipient, and not by the data
publisher. The only task of the data publisher is to
anonymize the data for publication.
2. Publication of data, and not of data mining results. The
aim of PPDP is producing privacy-preserving datasets,
and not anonymized datasets of classifiers, association
rules, or aggregate statistics. This sets PPDP apart from
privacy-preserving data mining (PPDM), where the final
usage of the data is known at dataset compilation time.
3. Truthfulness at the record level. Each record of the pub-
lished database must correspond to a real-world subject.
Moreover, all information on a subject must map to
actual activities or features of the subject. This avoids
that fictitious data introduces unpredictable biases in the
anonymized datasets.
Our privacy model will obey the principles above. We stress
that they impose that the privacy model must be agnostic
of data usage (points 1 and 2), and that it cannot rely on
randomized, perturbed, permuted and synthetic data (point 3).
B. Attacker model
Unlike PPDP requirements, the attacker model is necessarily
specific to the type of data we consider, and it is characterized
by the knowledge and goal of the adversary. The former
describes the information the opponent possesses, while the
latter represents his privacy-threatening objective.
1) Attacker knowledge: In trajectory datasets, each data
record is a sequence of spatiotemporal samples. We assume an
attacker who can track a target subscriber continuously during
any amount of time τ . The adversary knowledge consists then
in all spatiotemporal samples in the victim’s trajectory over a
continuous1 time interval of duration τ .
2) Attacker goal: Attacks against user privacy in published
data can have different objectives, and a comprehensive clas-
sification is provided in [14]. Two classes of attacks are espe-
cially relevant in the context of mobile subscriber trajectory
data. Both exploit the uniqueness of movement patterns that,
as mentioned in Sec. I, characterizes trajectory data.
1Non-continuous tracking in the attacker model is an interesting but very
challenging open problem. A mitigative solution realisable with our model is
considering a τ that covers all disjoint tracking intervals.
• Record linkage attacks. These attacks aim at univocally
distinguishing an individual in the database. A successful
record linkage enables cross-database correlation, which
may ultimately unveil the identity of the user. Record
linkage attacks on mobile traffic data have been repeat-
edly and successfully demonstrated [8]–[10]. As men-
tioned in Sec. I, they have also been used for subsequent
cross-database correlations [11]–[13].
• Probabilistic attacks. These attacks let an adversary
with partial information about an individual enlarge his
knowledge on that individual by accessing the database.
They are especially relevant to spatiotemporal trajecto-
ries, as shown by seminal works that first unveiled the
anonymization issues of mobile traffic datasets [8], [9].
Let us imagine a scenario where an adversary knows a
small set of spatiotemporal points in the trajectory of
a subscriber (because, e.g., he met the target individual
there). A successful probabilistic attack would reveal the
complete movements of the subscriber to the attacker,
who could then use them to infer sensitive information
about the victim, such as home/work locations, daily
routines, or visits to healthcare structures.
Our privacy model will address both classes of attacks above,
led by an adversary with knowledge described in Sec. II-B1.
C. Privacy model
Our privacy model is designed following the PPDP re-
quirements and attacker model presented before. We start by
considering suitable privacy criteria against record linkage and
probabilistic attacks, in Sec. II-C1 and Sec. II-C2, respectively.
We then show how the first criterion is in fact a specialization
of the second, in Sec. II-C3, which allows us to focus on
a single unifying privacy model. Finally, we present the
elementary techniques that we employ to implement the target
privacy criterion, in Sec. II-C4.
1) k-anonymity: The k-anonymity criterion realizes the
indistinguishability principle, by commending that each record
in a database must be indistinguishable from at least k−1 other
records in the same database [15]. In our case, this maps to
ensuring that each subscriber is hidden in a crowd of k users
whose trajectories cannot be told apart. The popularity of k-
anonymity for PPDP has led to indiscriminated use beyond its
scope, and subsequent controversy on the privacy guarantees
it can provide. E.g., k-anonymity has been proven ineffective
againt attacks aiming at attribute linkage (including exploits
of insufficient side-information diversity), at localizing users,
or at disclosing their presence and meetings [16]–[18].
However, k-anonymity remains a legitimate criterion against
record linkage attacks on any kind of database [14]. Therefore,
this privacy model protects trajectory data from the first type
of attack in Sec. II-B, including its variations in [8]–[13].
2) kτ,ǫ-anonymity: No privacy criterion proposed to date
can safeguard spatiotemporal trajectory data from the second
type of attacks in Sec. II-B, i.e., probabilistic attacks. This
forces us to define an original criterion, as follows.
Fig. 1. Illustrative example of kτ,ǫ-anonymity of user i, with k=2.
The pertinent principle here is the so-called uninformative
principle, i.e., ensuring that the difference between the knowl-
edge of the adversary before and after accessing a database
is small [16]. In our context, this principle warrants that an
attacker who knows some subset of a subscriber’s movements
cannot extract from the dataset a substantially longer portion
of that user’s trajectory.
To attain the uninformative principle, we introduce the
kτ,ǫ-anonymity privacy criterion. kτ,ǫ-anonymity can be seen
as a variation of km-anonymity, which establishes that each
individual in a dataset must be indistinguishable from at least
k−1 other users in the same dataset, when limiting the attacker
knowledge to any set of m attributes [19]. kτ,ǫ-anonymity
tailors km-anonymity to our scenario, as follows.
• As per Sec. II-B, the attacker knowledge can be any
continued sequence of spatiotemporal samples covering a
time interval of length at most τ : thus, the m parameter of
km-anonymity maps to the (variable) set of samples con-
tained in any time period τ . During any such time period,
every trajectory in the dataset must be indistinguishable
from at least other k − 1 trajectories.
• The maximum additional knowledge that the attacker
is allowed to learn is called leakage; it consists of the
spatiotemporal samples of the target user’s trajectory
contained in a time interval of duration at most ǫ, disjoint
from the original τ . In order to fulfill the uninformative
principle, the leakage ǫ must be small.
The two requirements above imply alternating in time the k−1
trajectories that provide anonymization. An intuitive example
is provided in Fig. 1. There, the trajectory of a target user
i is 2τ,ǫ-anonymized using those of five other subscribers.
The overlapping between the trajectories of a, b, c, d, e and
that of i is partial and varied. An adversary knowing a sub-
trajectory of i during any time interval of duration τ always
finds at least one other user with a movement pattern that
is identical to that of i during that interval, but different
elsewhere. With this knowledge, the adversary cannot tell
apart i from the other subscriber, and thus cannot attribute
full trajectories to one user or the other. As this holds no
matter where the knowledge interval is shifted to, the attacker
can never retrieve the complete movement patterns of i: this
achieves the uninformative principle. Still, the adversary can
increase its knowledge in some cases. Let us consider the
interval τ indicated in the figure: the trajectories of i, d and e
are identical for some time after τ , which allows associating to
i the movements during ǫ: the opponent learns one additional
spatiotemporal sample of i.
3) Relationship between the privacy criteria: It is easy to
see that k-anonymity is a special case of kτ,ǫ-anonymity. As a
matter of fact, the latter criterion reduces to the former when
τ + ǫ covers the whole temporal duration of the trajectory
dataset. Then, kτ,ǫ-anonymity commends that each complete
trajectory is indistinguishable from k − 1 other trajectories,
which is the definition of k-anonymity. Our point here is that
an anonymization solution that implements kτ,ǫ-anonymity
can be straightforwardly employed to attain k-anonymity as
well, by properly adjusting the τ and ǫ parameters.
In the light of these considerations, we address the problem
of achieving kτ,ǫ-anonymity in datasets of spatiotemporal
trajectories of mobile subscribers. By doing so, we develop
a complete anonymization solution that is effective against
probabilistic attacks, but can also be specialized to guarantee
k-anonymity and counter record linkage attacks.
4) Generalization and suppression: In order to enforce
kτ,ǫ-anonymity for all users in the dataset, we need to tweak
the spatiotemporal samples in the trajectories of individuals,
so that the criterion in Sec. II-C2 is respected for all of them.
To that end, we rely on two elementary techniques, i.e.,
spatiotemporal generalization and suppression of samples.
Spatiotemporal generalization reduces the precision of tra-
jectory samples in space and time, so as to make the sam-
ples of two or more users indistinguishable. Suppression
removes from the trajectories those samples that are too hard
to anonymize. Both techniques are lossy, i.e., imply some
reduction of precision in the data. Yet, unlike other approaches,
these techniques conform to the PPDP requirement of truth-
fulness at the record level, see Sec. II-A.
III. ACHIEVING kτ,ǫ-ANONYMITY
Our goal is ensuring that an anonymized dataset of mobile
subscriber trajectories respects the uninformative principle,
by implementing, through generalization and suppression, the
kτ,ǫ-anonymity of all subscriber trajectories in the dataset.
Clearly, we aim at doing so while minimizing the loss of
spatiotemporal granularity in the data.
We start by defining the basic operation of generalizing
a set of spatiotemporal samples, and the associated cost in
terms of loss of granularity, in Sec. III-A. We then extend both
notions to (sub-)trajectories, in Sec. III-B. Building on these
definitions, we discuss in Sec. III-C the optimal spatiotemporal
generalization of k (sub-)trajectories. We implement the result
into k-merge, an optimal low-complexity algorithm that
generalizes (sub-)trajectories with minimal loss of data granu-
larity, in Sec. III-D. Once able to merge (sub-)trajectories op-
timally, we propose an approach to guarantee kτ,ǫ-anonymity
of the trajectory of a single user, in Sec. III-E, and we then
scale the solution to multiple users in Sec. III-F. Finally,
we introduce kte-hide, an algorithm that ensures kτ,ǫ-
anonymity in spatiotemporal trajectory datasets, in Sec. III-G.
A. Generalization of samples
A (raw) sample of a spatiotemporal trajectory represents the
position of a subscriber at a given time, and we model it with
Fig. 2. Example of merging of trajectories Si = {si,j} and Si′ = {si′,j}
into a generalized trajectory G = {G}. For clarity, space is unidimensional.
a length-3 real vector s = (t(s), x(s), y(s)). Since a dataset
is characterized by a finite granularity in time and space, a
sample is in fact a slot spanning some minimum temporal
and spatial intervals. The vector entries above can be regarded
as the origins of a normalized length-1 time interval and a
normalized 1×1 two-dimensional area2.
Spatiotemporal generalization merges together two or more
raw samples into a generalized sample, i.e., a slot with a
larger span. Mathematically, a generalized sample G can be
represented as the set of the merged samples. There is a cost
associated with merging samples, which is related to the span
of the corresponding generalized sample, i.e., to the loss of
granularity induced by the generalization. The cost of the
operation of merging a set of samples into the generalized
sample G is defined as
c (G) = ct (G) cs (G) , (1)
where ct (G) represents the cost in the time dimension, while
cs (G) is the cost in the space dimensions.
Let G1 and G2 be two disjoint generalized samples (i.e.,
G1 ∩ G2 = ∅). Then, we make the following two assumptions
on the time and space merging costs:
ct (G1 ∪ G2) ≥ ct (G1) + ct (G2) (2)
cs (G1 ∪ G2) ≥ max {cs (G1) , cs (G2)} . (3)
Hereafter, we use the following definitions to implement the
generic costs ct (G) and cs (G):
ct (G) = ∆t (G) (4)
cs (G) = ∆x (G) + ∆y (G) , (5)
where
∆⋆(G) = max
s∈G
⋆(s)−min
s∈G
⋆(s) + 1, (6)
with ⋆ ∈ {t, x, y}, is the span in each dimension.
Therefore, in our implementation, c (G) is the area of a
rectangle with sides ∆t (G) and ∆x (G)+∆y (G). A graphical
example is provided in Fig. 2, where two raw samples si,1
and si′,1 are merged into a generalized sample G1, spanning
2For instance, in our reference datasets, the sample granularity is 1 minute
in time and 100 meters in space. A raw sample spans then one slot (i.e., 1
minute) in time and one slot (i.e., a 100×100 m2 area) in space. However,
our discussion is general, and holds for any precision in the data.
∆t(G1) in time and ∆x(G1) in space (portrayed as unidimen-
sional in the figure, for the sake of readability).
Remark 1: The rationale for our choice of costs is com-
putational efficiency. Also, summing the two space spans
before multiplication allows balancing the time and space
contributions. Finally, note that with the definition in (5), the
space merging cost assumption in (3) is trivially true. Instead,
the definition in (4) lets the time merging cost assumption in
(2) hold only if the time intervals spanned by G1 and G2 are
non-overlapping. The time coherence property that we will
introduce in Sec. III-B ensures that this is the always case.
B. Generalization of trajectories
A spatiotemporal (sub-)trajectory describes the movements
of a single subscriber during the dataset timespan. Formally, a
trajectory is an ordered vector of samples S = (s1, . . . , sN ),
where the ordering is induced by the time coordinate, i.e.,
t(si) < t(si′) if and only if i < i′.
A generalized trajectory, obtained by merging different
trajectories, is defined as an ordered vector of generalized
samples G = (G1, . . . ,GZ). Here the ordering is more subtle,
and based on the fact that the time intervals spanned by the
generalized samples are non-overlapping, a property that will
be called time coherence. More precisely, if Gi and Gi′ , i < i′,
are two generalized samples of G, then
max
s∈Gi
t(s) < min
s∈G
i′
t(s).
An example of a generalized trajectory G merging two
trajectories Si and Si′ is provided in Fig. 2. G fulfils time
coherence, as its generalized samples are temporally disjoint.
Remark 2: Time coherence is a defining property of gen-
eralized trajectories in PPDP. As a matter of fact, publishing
trajectory data with time-overlapping samples would generate
semantic ambiguity and make analyses cumbersome.
Analogously to the cost of merging samples, we can define a
cost of merging multiple trajectories into a generalized trajec-
tory. We define such cost as the sum of costs of all generalized
samples belonging to it. More precisely, if G = (G1, . . . ,GZ),
and c(·) is defined as in (1), then the cost of G is given by:
C (G) =
Z∑
i=1
c (Gi) . (7)
Remark 3: The cost in (7) is the overall surface covered by
samples of the generalized trajectory over the spatiotemporal
plane. E.g., in Fig. 2, the cost of G is the sum of the three
areas, i.e., c(G1)+ c(G2)+ c(G3). It is thus proportional to the
total loss of granularity induced by the generalization.
C. Optimal generalization of trajectories
We now formalize the problem of optimal generalization of
spatiotemporal (sub-)trajectories. Suppose that we have k tra-
jectories S1, . . . ,Sk, with Si = (si,1, . . . , si,Ni), i = 1, . . . , k.
The goal is a generalized trajectory G∗ = (G∗1 , . . . ,G∗Z) from
S1, . . . ,Sk, which satisfies the following conditions.
i) The union of all generalized samples of G∗ must coincide
with the union of all samples of S1, . . . ,Sk, i.e.,
G∗1 ∪ · · · ∪ G
∗
Z = S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sk , S,
where Si =
⋃Ni
j=1{si,j}. Thus, G∗ is a partition of the set S
of all samples in the input trajectories: it does not add any
alien sample or discard any input sample.
ii) Each generalized sample contains at least one sample
from each of the k input trajectories S1, . . . ,Sk, i.e.,
G∗i ∩ Si′ 6= ∅, i = 1, . . . , Z, i
′ = 1, . . . , k.
This imposes that each input trajectory contributes to each
generalized sample of G∗. Otherwise, the merging could
associate generalized samples to users that never visited the
generalized location at the generalized time, violating point 3
of the PPDP requirements in Sec. II-A.
iii) The cost of the merging is minimized, i.e.,
G
∗ = arg min
G∈K
C(G), (8)
where K is the set of all partitions of S satisfying time
coherence as well as condition ii) above, and C(G) is in (7).
In Fig. 2, the generalized trajectory G fulfils all these require-
ments, and is thus the optimal merge G∗ of Si and Si′ .
Solving the problem above with a brute-force search is
computationally prohibitive, since K has a size that grows
exponentially with |S|/k, where | · | denotes cardinality. How-
ever, we can characterize G∗ so that it is possible to compute
it with low complexity. To that end, we name elementary a
partition G ∈ K that cannot be refined to another partition
within K. In other words, none of the generalized samples
of an elementary partition can be split into two generalized
samples without violating conditions i) and ii) above, or time
coherence. Then, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Given the input trajectories S1, . . . ,Sk, the
optimal G∗ defined in (8) is an elementary partition.
Proof: Suppose G ∈ K is not elementary, so that it can
be refined to another partition G˜ ∈ K. In particular, with-
out loss of generality, suppose that G = (G1, . . . ,GZ) and
G˜ =
(
G˜1, . . . , G˜Z+1
)
, where
Gi =
{
G˜i, i < Z
G˜Z ∪ G˜Z+1, i = Z.
(9)
From (7) and (9), the difference between the costs of G and
G˜ is given by
C(G)− C(G˜) = c(GZ)− c(G˜Z)− c(G˜Z+1). (10)
Since GZ contains the union of raw samples in G˜Z and
G˜Z+1, we can apply properties (2) and (3) (where (2) holds
because of time coherence) and obtain:
c(GZ) = ct(GZ)cs(GZ)
≥
(
ct(G˜Z) + ct(G˜Z+1)
)
cs(GZ)
≥ ct(G˜Z)cs(G˜Z) + ct(G˜Z+1)cs(G˜Z+1)
= c(G˜Z) + c(G˜Z+1). (11)
Fig. 3. Partition tree for the two trajectories Si = {si,j} and Si′ = {si′,j}
in Fig. 2. Nodes in the complete tree represent the set K of valid partitions
of the set of raw samples S . Elementary partitions are the tree leaves and
constitute K∗. The partition in Fig. 2 is the leftmost leaf in the tree.
Algorithm 1: k-merge algorithm pseudocode.
input : Trajectories S1, . . . ,Sk , where Si = (si,1, . . . , si,Ni )
output: Generalized sample set G∗, Cost C (G∗)
1 foreach i ∈ [1, k] do
2 Si =
⋃Ni
j=1{si,j};
3 S ← timesort (S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sk);
4 Cost ← (0,∞, . . . ,∞);
5 Partition ← (NULL, . . . , NULL);
6 foreach sθ ∈ S do
7 θ′ = θ − 1;
8 while incomplete (sθ′ , . . . , sθ) do
9 θ′ = θ′ − 1;
10 while elementary (sθ′ , . . . , sθ) do
11 G ← generalize (sθ′ , . . . , sθ);
12 if Cost [θ] > c (G) + Cost [θ′ − 1] then
13 Cost [θ] ← c (G) + Cost [θ′ − 1];
14 Partition ← (θ′ − 1,G);
15 θ′ = θ′ − 1;
16 G∗ ← visit (Partition);
17 C (G∗) ← Cost [ |S| ];
Comparing (11) with (10), we get that C(G) ≥ C(G˜).
Thus, to search for the optimal G∗, we can drop G and keep
only G˜. If G˜ is not elementary, then we can find one of its
refinements, and repeat the above steps to drop also G˜. This
way, we can drop all partitions that are not elementary and be
left only with elementary partitions as G∗ candidates.
If we build a tree of partitions belonging to K, such that the
S is the root and each node is a partition whose children are
its refinements, the leaves are the elementary partitions, which
form a subset K∗. The above proposition states that we can
limit the search of G∗ to K∗, drastically reducing the search
space of G∗ to the set K∗ ⊂ K of elementary partitions of S.
An example is provided in Fig. 3, for the trajectories in Fig. 2.
D. Optimal merging algorithm
We propose k-merge, an algorithm to efficiently search
the set of raw samples S, extract the subset of elementary
partitions, K∗, and identify the optimal partition G∗.
The algorithm, detailed in Alg. 1, starts by populating a set
of raw samples S, whose items si,j are ordered according
to their time value t(si,j) (lines 1–3). Then, it processes
all samples according to their temporal ordering (line 6).
Specifically, the algorithm tests, for each sample sθ in position
θ, all sets {sθ′, . . . , sθ}, with θ′ < θ, as follows.
The first loop skips incomplete sets that do not contain
at least one sample from each input trajectory (line 8).
The second loop runs until the first non-elementary set is
encountered (line 10). Therein, the algorithm generalizes the
current (complete and elementary) set {sθ′, . . . , sθ} to G, and
checks if G reduces the total merging cost up to sθ. If so,
the cost is updated by summing c(G) to the accumulated cost
up to sθ′−1, and the resulting (partial) partition of S that
includes G is stored (lines 11–14). Once out of the loops,
the cost associated to the last sample is the optimal cost, and
it is sufficient to backward navigate the partition structure to
retrieve the associated G∗ (lines 16–17).
Note that, in order to update the cost of including the
current sample sθ (line 13), the algorithm only checks previous
samples in time. It thus needs that the optimal decision up to
sθ does not depend on any of the samples in the original
trajectories that come later in time than sθ. The following
proposition guarantees that this is the case.
Proposition 2: Let G∗ = (G∗1 , . . . ,G∗Z) be the optimal
generalized trajectory and let us make the hypothesis that sθ
and sθ+1 do not belong to the same generalized sample of
G
∗
. Let G∗p =
(
G∗1 , . . . ,G
∗
Z1
)
and G∗f =
(
G∗Z1+1, . . . ,G
∗
Z
)
,
so that sθ ∈ G∗Z1 and sθ+1 ∈ G
∗
Z1+1
. Then, G∗p can be derived
independently of G∗f .
Proof: Let G, Gp and Gf be any generalized se-
quences containing raw samples (s1, . . . , sN), (s1, . . . , sθ) and
(sθ+1, . . . , sN ), respectively. According to the cost definition,
we generally have
min
G
C(G) ≤ min
Gp,Gf
C((Gp,Gf))
= min
Gp
C(Gp) + min
Gf
C(Gf),
where (Gp,Gf) is the concatenation of Gp and Gf . However,
by virtue of the hypothesis and by construction,
min
G
C(G) = C(G∗)
= C(G∗p) + C(G
∗
f )
= min
Gp
C(Gp) + min
Gf
C(Gf)
so that, to minimize C(G) we only need to minimize C(Gp)
and C(Gf) independently.
The above proposition guarantees that the algorithm is
exploring all possibilities, and as a result, the cost C(G∗)
returned by k-merge is optimal, i.e., it is the minimum loss
of granularity necessary to merge the original trajectories.
Note that k-merge has a very low complexity in practical
cases. Let l(θ) be the number of sets {sθ′ , . . . , sθ} that are both
complete and elementary for a given θ. Then, the number of
computations and comparisons of sample generalization costs
that are performed in k-merge is
∑
θ l(θ) = |S|l, where l is
the average value of l(θ). If l = O(1), which happens in most
trajectory data where the samples of the input trajectories are
intercalated in the time axis, then k-merge runs in a time
O(|S|), i.e., linear in the number of samples.
Fig. 4. Overlapping hiding set structure realizing kτ,ǫ-anonymity for user i.
E. Single user kτ,ǫ-anonymity
We implement kτ,ǫ-anonymity for a generic subscriber i as
shown in Fig. 4. We discretize time into intervals of length ǫ,
named epochs. At the beginning of the m-th epoch, we select
a set of k−1 users different from i, named a hiding set of i and
denoted as him. The hiding set him provides k-anonymity to
subscriber i for a subsequent time window τ+ǫ. By repeating
the hiding set selection for all epochs, τ/ǫ + 1 subsequent
hiding sets of user i overlap at any point in time. Such a
structure of overlapping hiding sets assures the following.
First, subscriber i is k-anonymized for any possible knowl-
edge of the attacker. No matter where a time interval of length
τ is shifted to along the time dimension, it will be always
completely covered by the time window of one hiding set,
i.e., a period during which i’s trajectory is indistinguishable
from those of k − 1 other users. As an example, in Fig. 4,
the attacker knowledge τ (bottom-right of the plot) is fully
enclosed in the time window of hi6, and his sub-trajectory is
indistinguishable from those of users in hi6.
Second, the additional knowledge leaked to the attacker is
exactly ǫ. From the first point above, the adversary cannot
tell apart i from the users in the hiding set him whose time
window covers his knowledge τ . However, the adversary can
follow the (generalized) trajectories of i and users in him for
the full time window τ + ǫ. Therefore, the adversary can infer
new information about the (generalized) trajectory of i during
the time window period that exceeds his original knowledge
τ , i.e., ǫ. E.g., in Fig. 4, the time window of hi6 spans before
and after the attacker knowledge τ , for a total of ǫ.
The two guarantees above let kτ,ǫ-anonymity, as defined
in Sec. II-C2, be fulfilled for the generic user i. The epoch
duration ǫ maps to the knowledge leakage. The following
important remarks are in order.
1. Hiding set selection. The structure of overlapping hiding
sets is to be implemented so that the loss of accuracy in the
kτ,ǫ-anonymized trajectory is minimized. Thus, the users in
the generic hiding set him shall be those who, during the time
window τ + ǫ starting at the m-th epoch, have sub-trajectories
with minimum k-merge cost with respect to i’s.
2. Reuse constraint. The uninformative principle requires
alternating the k − 1 trajectories used in different hiding sets,
as per Sec. II-C2. A simple way to enforce this is limiting the
inclusion of any subscriber in at most one hiding set of i.
Fig. 5. Example of k-pick constraint, with k=3, for user i during the m-th
hiding set selection. Here ǫ = τ , hence the time windows of hiding sets span
two epochs. For clarity, space is unidimensional. Figure best viewed in colors.
3. Generalization set. As evidenced by the example in Fig. 4,
the configuration of hiding sets changes at every epoch, and
τ/ǫ + 1 hiding sets overlap during each epoch. This means
that a spatiotemporal generalization must be used to merge a
set of χ = 1 + (τ/ǫ + 1)(k − 1) trajectories at each epoch.
4. Epoch duration tradeoff. The epoch duration ǫ is a
configurable system parameter, whose setting gives rise to
a tradeoff between knowledge leakage and accuracy of the
anonymized data. A lower ǫ reduces knowledge leakage.
However, it also increases χ, which typically entails a more
marked generalization and a higher loss of data granularity.
F. Multiple user kτ,ǫ-anonymity
Scaling kτ,ǫ-anonymity from a single user to all subscribers
in a dataset implies that the choice of hiding sets cannot be
made independently for every user. Therefore, trajectory sim-
ilarity and reuse constraint fulfillment are not sufficient norms
anymore. In addition to the above, the selection of hiding sets
needs to be concerted among all users so as to ensure that
the generalized trajectories are correctly intertwined and all
subscribers are k-anonymized during each time window τ + ǫ.
An intuitive solution is enforcing full consistency: including
a subscriber i into the hiding set of user i′ at epoch m makes i′
automatically become part of i’s hiding set at the same epoch.
Formally, i ∈ hi′m ⇒ i′ ∈ him, ∀i 6= i′, ∀m.
In fact, full consistency is an unnecessarily restrictive con-
dition. It is sufficient that hiding set concertation satisfies a
k-pick constraint: during the m-th epoch, each user i in the
dataset has to be picked in the hiding sets of at least other k−1
subscribers. Formally, |{i′, i ∈ hi′m}| ≥ k − 1, ∀i, ∀m. This
provides an increased flexibility over all existing approaches
which rely on fully consistent generalization strategies.
The rationale behind the k-pick constraint is best illustrated
by means of a toy example, in Fig. 5. The figure portrays the
spatiotemporal samples of users i, i′ and i′′ during epochs
m and m+ 1. The sub-trajectory of subscriber i in this time
interval is Si = (si,1, si,2, si,3), represented as black squares;
equivalently for i′ (orange triangles) and i′′ (red circles).
Samples denoted by letters belong to other users a, b, c and
d, and they are instrumental to our example.
Let us assume that ǫ = τ (i.e., hiding sets span an interval
2τ = 2ǫ, or epochs m and m+1), and k = 3. At the beginning
of the m-th epoch, for subscriber i (resp., i′ and i′′), one needs
to select k−1 = 2 other users that constitute the hiding set him
(resp., hi′m and hi
′′
m ). Let us consider him={a, b}, hi
′
m={i, c},
h
i′′
m={i, d}, which results in the generalized sub-trajectories
Gi, Gi′ , Gi′′ in Fig. 5. The configuration satisfies the k-pick
constraint for subscriber i, who is picked in k− 1 = 2 hiding
sets, i.e., hi′m and hi
′′
m . Suppose now that the attacker knows
the spatiotemporal samples of i’s trajectory during any time
interval τ within the m-th and (m + 1)-th epoch: as these
samples are within Gi, Gi′ and Gi′′ , then i is 3-anonymized.
The key consideration is that i is k-anonymized at epoch m
by i′ and i′′, yet it does not contribute to the anonymization
of neither i′ nor i′′, as i′, i′′ /∈ him. Thus, it is possible to
decouple the choice of hiding sets across subscribers, without
jeopardizing the privacy guarantees granted by k-anonymity.
Such a decoupling entails a dramatic increase of flexibility in
the choice of hiding sets, as per the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Given a dataset of U trajectories and a fixed
value of k, the number of hiding set configurations allowed
by full consistency is a fraction of that allowed by k-pick that
vanishes more than exponentially for U →∞.
Proof: Let us consider a set of U users, where U is a multiple
of k, since otherwise full consistency cannot even be enforced.
Let us build a k×U matrix, in which the i-th column contains
(i,him), where him is the hiding set for user i at a given epoch
m. (For simplicity, in this proof, we do not take into account
the reuse constraints.)
The solution set under the k-pick constraint coincides with
the set of normalized Latin rectangles3 of size k × U . Let
Kk,U be the number of k × U normalized Latin rectangles,
which equals the number of possible solutions for our problem
with the k-pick constraint. An old result by Erdo˝s and Kaplan-
sky [20] states that, for U →∞ and k = O ((logU)3/2−ǫ)),
Kk,U ∼ (U !)
k−1 exp (−k(k − 1)/2) (12)
If, instead, we enforce full consistency, then the number of
solutions equals the number of different partitions of a size-U
set into U/k subsets, all with size k. Denoting by Ck,U this
number, we can compute it as
Ck,U =
(
U
k
)(
U−k
k
)
· · · · ·
(
k
k
)
(U/k)!
=
U !
(k!)U/k (U/k)!
(13)
Thus, for fixed k and U →∞
Ck,U
Kk,U
∼
exp (k(k − 1)/2)
(U !)k−2(k!)U/k (U/k)!
which tends to zero more than exponentially for U →∞.
For large datasets of hundreds of thousands trajectories, k-
pick enables a much richer choice of merging configurations.
This reasonably unbinds better combinations of the original
trajectories, and results in more accurate anonymized data.
3A k×n Latin rectangle, k ≤ n, is a matrix in which all entries are taken
from the set {1, . . . , n}, in such a way that each row and column contains
each value at most once. The Latin rectangle is said to be normalized if the
first row is the ordered set (1, . . . , n).
Algorithm 2: kte-hide algorithm pseudocode.
input : Anonymization level k, attacker knowledge τ , leakage ǫ
input : Trajectory dataset D
output: Anonymized trajectory dataset D
1 foreach eθ ∈ epochs (D) do
2 Df ← filter (eθ,D);
3 foreach Si,Si′ ∈ Df ,Si 6= Si′ do
4 Costs [Si,Si′ ] ← k-merge (Si,Si′ );
5 Clusters [θ] ← spectralClustering (Costs);
6 if θ ≥ τ/ǫ+ 1 then
7 foreach c ∈ Clusters [θ] do
8 Subs ← split (c,Clusters [θ − τ/ǫ : θ − 1]);
9 foreach cs ∈ Subs [θ] do
10 gs ← graph (cs);
11 gsc ← greedyCycle (gs,k);
12 if ∃gsc then
13 foreach Si ∈ cs do
14 hi
θ−τ/ǫ
← gsc[Si];
15 else
16 suppression (cs);
17 foreach eθ ∈ epochs (D) do
18 foreach Si ∈ D do
19 h ← filter (eθ,Si,hiθ−τ/ǫ, . . . ,hiθ);
20 D← replace (k-merge (h));
G. Practical kτ,ǫ-anonymity algorithm
Capitalizing on all previous results, we design kte-hide,
an algorithm that achieves kτ,ǫ-anonymity in datasets of spa-
tiotemporal trajectories. Since even the optimal solution to the
simpler k-anonymity problem is known to be NP-hard [14],
we resort here to an heuristic solution.
The algorithm, in Alg. 2, proceeds on a per-epoch basis
(line 1), finding, for each epoch θ, a set of χ users (with
χ defined as in Sec. III-E) that hide each subscriber at low
merging cost. An extensive search for the set of χ users would
have an excessive cost O(Uχ), where U is the number of
users in dataset, and χ ≥ 3. Thus, we adopt a computationally
efficient approach, by clustering user sub-trajectories based on
their pairwise merging cost. Costs are computed via k-merge
(lines 2–4), and a standard spectral clustering algorithm groups
similar trajectories into same clusters (line 5). This allows
operating on each cluster independently in the following.
Starting from epoch τ/ǫ+1 (line 6), the algorithm processes
each identified cluster at epoch θ separately (line 7). It
splits the current cluster c into subsets, which contain user
trajectories that share the same sequence of clusters during
the last τ/ǫ epochs (line 8).
Let cs be any of such subsets: cs is mapped to a directed
graph whose nodes are the users within cs, and there is an
edge going from user j to user i if j can be in the hiding set
h
i
θ−τ/ǫ of i without violating the reuse constraint (line 10). If
a k-anonymity level is required, k − 1 directional cycles are
then built within the graph, involving all nodes in the graph,
in such a way that each node has a different parent in each
cycle (line 11). The hiding set hit−τ/ǫ is then obtained as the
set of user i’s parents in the k − 1 cycles (lines 13–14).
Such a construction of hiding sets complies with the k-pick
constraint, since every user i is in the hiding set of k−1 other
users. It may however happen that no valid k − 1 cycles can
be created within cs: this means that subscribers in cs share
a sub-trajectory that is rare in the dataset, and their number
is insufficient to implement kτ,ǫ-anonymity. In this case, we
apply suppression and remove all spatiotemporal samples of
such users’ sub-trajectories (line 16). Once all hiding sets are
determined, the merging is performed, on each epoch and for
each user, using k-merge (lines 17–20).
Overall, the heuristic algorithm above guarantees that over-
lapping hiding sets that satisfy the reuse constraint (Sec. III-E)
are selected for all users. It also ensures that such a choice of
hiding sets fulfils the k-pick requirement (Sec. III-F). Together,
these conditions realize kτ,ǫ-anonymity of the trajectory data.
The complexity of kte-hide is as follows. Let U be
the number of users, Θ be the number of epochs and N be
the average number of samples per user per epoch, so that
Ntot = ΘUN is the total number of samples in the dataset.
Then: (i) lines 2–4 perform k-merge on two input trajectories
ΘU2 times, each of them with a complexity O(N ), for a total
complexity of O(NtotU); (ii) spectral clustering (line 5) can
be implemented with complexity O(ΘU2) using KASP [21];
(iii) the complexity of lines 17–20, performing k-merge
on χ input trajectories ΘU times, is O(Ntotχ). All other
subroutines of kte-hide have a much smaller complexity.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate our anonymization solutions with five real-
world datasets of mobile subscriber trajectories, introduced
in Sec. IV-A. A comparative evaluation of k-merge is
in Sec. IV-B, while the results of kτ,ǫ-anonymization via
kte-hide are presented in Sec. IV-C.
A. Reference datasets
Our datasets consist of user trajectories extracted from call
detail records (CDR) released by Orange within their D4D
Challenges [22], and by the University of Minnesota [23].
Three datasets, denoted as abi, dak and shn, describe
the spatiotemporal trajectories of tens of thousands mobile
subscribers in urban regions, while the other two, civ and
sen hereinafter, are nationwide. In all datasets, user positions
map to the latitude and longitude of the current base station
(BS) they are associated to. The main features of the datasets
are listed in Tab. I, revealing the heterogeneity of the scenarios.
In order to ensure that all datasets yield a minimum level
of detail in the trajectory of each tracked subscriber, we had
to preprocess the abi and civ datasets. Specifically, we
only retained those users whose trajectories have at least one
spatiotemporal sample on every day in a specific two-week
period. No filtering was needed for the dak and sen datasets,
which already contain users who are active for more than 75%
of a 2-week timespan, and shn, whose users have even higher
sampling rates.
In all datasets, user positions map to the latitude and lon-
gitude of the current base station (BS) they are associated to.
We discretized the resulting positions on a 100-m regular grid,
TABLE I
FEATURES OF REFERENCE MOBILE TRAFFIC DATASETS.
Dataset Surface BS BS/Km2 Users Density Samples Timespan
[Km2] [user/Km2] [per user/h] [days]
abi 2,731 400 0.14 29,191 10.68 0.90 14
dak 1,024 457 0.44 71,146 69,47 0.74 14
shn 3,329 2961 0.89 50,000 15.01 1.00 1
civ 322,463 1238 0.0038 82,728 0.26 0.75 14
sen 196,712 1666 0.0085 286,926 1.45 0.45 14
TABLE II
COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF K-MERGE
Dataset k
k-merge Static generalization [success %] W4M GLOVE
Time Space 2h - 4Km 4h - 10Km 8h - 20Km Deleted Created Time Space Time Space
[min] [Km] [%] [%] [min] [Km] [min] [Km]
abi
2 51 0.624 27.2 56.7 80.3 9.6 22.0 57 1.166 114 2.626
5 228 3.423 0.7 11.0 40.5 31.9 31.2 185 3.809 292 3.740
8 349 5.720 0.1 5.1 22.6 23.9 36.7 198 6.163 — —
dak
2 47 0.701 43.2 68.7 93.3 5.9 11.4 39 1.466 116 2.498
5 220 5.286 2.2 14.0 67.0 20.3 21.2 172 5.807 294 3.192
8 377 7.794 0.1 8.6 50.7 22.0 18.6 189 8.477 — —
which represents the finest spatial granularity we consider4.
Samples are timestamped with an precision of one minute.
This is the granularity granted in the abi and civ datasets.
The dak and sen datasets feature a temporal granularity of
10 minutes: in order to have comparable datasets, we added
a random uniform noise over a ten-minute timespan to each
sample, so as to artificially refine the time granularity of the
data to one minute as well. In the case of the shn dataset, the
precision is one second, and we used a one-minute binning to
uniform the data to the standard format.
B. Comparative evaluation of k-merge
Since no previous solution for kτ,ǫ-anonymity exists, we
are forced to compare our algorithms to previous techniques
in terms of simpler k-anonymity. Interestingly, this allows
validating our proposed approach for merging spatiotemporal
trajectories via the k-merge algorithm.
We thus run k-merge on 100 random k-tuples of mobile
users from the reference datasets, for different values of k,
and we record the spatiotemporal granularity retained by
the resulting generalized trajectories. We compare our results
against those obtained by the only three approaches proposed
in the literature for the k-anonymization of trajectories along
both spatial and temporal dimensions.
The first is static generalization [8], [9], which consists in a
homogeneous reduction of data granularity, decided arbitrarily
and imposed on all user trajectories. Static generalization is a
trial-and-error process, and it does not guarantee k-anonymity
of all users. The second benchmark solution is Wait for Me
(W4M) [36]. Intended for regularly sampled (e.g., GPS) trajec-
tories, W4M performs the minimum spatiotemporal translation
needed to push all the trajectories within the same cylindrical
volume. It allows the creation of new synthetic samples,
and it is thus not fully compliant with PPDP principles in
Sec. II-A. The latter operation is leveraged to improve the
matching among trajectories in a cluster, and assumes that
mobile objects (i.e., subscribers in our case) effectuate linear
constant-speed movements between spatiotemporal samples.
We use W4M with linear spatiotemporal distance (W4M-L),
i.e., the version intended for large databases such as those
we consider 5, and configure it with the settings suggested
in [36]. The third approach is GLOVE [10], which relies on a
heuristic measure of anonymizability to assess the similarity
4At 100-m spatial granularity, each grid cell contains at most one antenna
from the original dataset: the process does not cause any loss in data accuracy.
5Implementation at http://kdd.isti.cnr.it/W4M/.
of spatiotemporal trajectories. This measure is fed to a greedy
algorithm to achieve k-anonymity with limited loss of granu-
larity and without introducing fictitious data. However, unlike
k-merge, GLOVE does not provide an optimal solution, and
is computationally expensive.
The results of our comparative evaluation are summarized in
Tab. II, for the abi and dak datasets, when varying number k
of trajectories merged together. Similar results were obtained
for the other datasets, and are omitted due to space limitations.
We immediately note how static aggregation is an ineffective
approach: the percentage of successfully merged k-tuples is
well below 100%, even when dramatically reducing the data
granularity to 8 hours in time and 20 km in space. Instead,
k-merge, W4M and GLOVE can merge all of the k-tuples,
while retaining a good level of accuracy in the data. We can
directly compare the granularity in time (min) and space (km)
retained by k-merge, W4M and GLOVE in merging groups
of k trajectories: the spatiotemporal accuracy is comparable in
all cases. However, it is important to note that W4M attains
this result by deleting and creating a significant amount of
samples: in the end, only 40-70% of the original samples
are maintained in the generalized data. Conversely, all of the
generalized samples created by k-merge reflect the actual
real-world data. Also, k-merge obtains a level of precision
that is always higher than that of GLOVE, and scales better:
indeed, the complexity of GLOVE did not allow computing a
solution when k = 8.
Overall, the results uphold k-merge as the current state-of-
the-art solution to generalize sparse spatiotemporal trajectories
while obeying PPDP principles and minimizing accuracy loss.
C. Performance evaluation of kte-hide
We run kte-hide on our reference datasets of mobile sub-
scriber trajectories, so that they are kτ,ǫ-anonymized. As the
anonymized data are robust to probabilistic attacks by design,
we focus our evaluation on the cost of the anonymization,
i.e., the loss of granularity. All results refer to the case of
2τ,ǫ-anonymization, with ǫ = τ .
1) Citywide datasets: Fig. 6 portrays the mean, median
and first/third quartiles of the sample granularity in the kτ,ǫ-
anonymized citywide datasets abi, dak and shn. The plots
show how results vary when the adversary knowledge τ ranges
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Fig. 6. Spatial (a,b,c) and temporal (d,e,f) granularity versus the adversary knowledge τ in the citywide reference datasets.
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Fig. 7. Spatial (a,b) and temporal (c,d) granularity versus τ in the nationwide reference datasets.
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Fig. 8. Suppressed samples versus τ .
from 10 minutes to 4 hours6. They refer to the anonymized
data granularity in space7, in Fig.6a-c and time, in Fig.6d-f.
We remark how the kτ,ǫ-anonymized datasets retain signifi-
cant levels of accuracy, with a median granularity in the order
of 1-3 km in space and below 45 minutes in time. These levels
of precision are largely sufficient for most analyses on mobile
subscriber activities, as discussed in, e.g., [24]. The temporal
granularity is negatively affected by an increasing adversary
knowledge τ , which is expected. Interestingly, however, the
spatial granularity is only marginally impacted by τ : protecting
the data from a more knowledgeable attacker does not have a
significant cost in terms of spatial accuracy.
2) Nationwide datasets: Fig. 7 shows equivalent results
for the nationwide datasets civ and sen. The evolution of
temporal granularity versus τ , in Fig.7c-d is consistent with
citywide scenarios. Differences emerge in terms of spatial
granularity: in the civ case (Fig.7a) a reversed trend emerges,
as accuracy grows along with the attacker knowledge. This
counterintuitive result is explained by the thin user presence in
the civ dataset: as per Tab. I, civ has a density of subscribers
per Km2 that is one or two orders of magnitude lower than
those in our other reference datasets. Such a geographical
sparsity makes it difficult to find individuals with similar
spatial trajectories: increasing τ has then the effect of enlarging
the set of candidate trajectories for merging at each epoch, with
a positive influence on the accuracy in the generalized data.
These considerations are confirmed by the results with the
sen dataset (Fig.7b). As per Tab. I, this dataset features a
subscriber density that is about one order of magnitude higher
6The limited temporal span of the shn data prevents us from testing attacks
with knowledge τ higher than one hour. Indeed, a τ too close to the full dataset
duration implies that the opponent has an a-priori knowledge of the victim’s
trajectory that is comparable to that contained in the data, making attempts
at countering a probabilistic attack futile.
7The spatial granularity in Fig. 6 is expressed as the sum of spans along
the Cartesian axes. For instance, 1 km maps to, e.g., a square of side 500 m.
than that of civ, but around one order of magnitude lower
than those of the abi, dak and shn. Coherently, the spatial
granularity trend falls in between those observed for such
datasets, and it is not positively or negatively impacted by
the attacker knowledge.
More generally, the results in Fig. 7 demonstrate that
kte-hide can scale to large-scale real-world datasets. The
absolute performance is good, as the kτ,ǫ-anonymized data
retains substantial precision: the median levels of granularity
in space and time are comparable to those achieved in citywide
datasets. Finally, we remark that, in all cases, the amount of
samples suppressed by kte-hide is in the 1%–7% range.
3) Sample suppression: The amount of samples suppressed
by kte-hide in the kτ,ǫ-anonymization process is portrayed
in Fig. 8. We note that resorting to suppression becomes more
frequent as the adversary knowledge increases. However, even
when the opponent is capable of tracking a user during four
continued hours, the percentage of suppressed samples remains
low, typically well below 10%. Moreover, the trend in the
long-timespan datasets is clearly sublinear, suggesting that
suppression does not become prevalent with higher τ . Results
are fairly consistent across citywide datasets8. Nationwide
datasets are also aligned, and yield even lower suppression
rates, at around 2%. This difference is explained by the fact
that a larger number of users allows for a more efficient
spectral clustering in kte-hide.
4) Disaggregation over time: As an intriguing concluding
remark, Fig. 9 reveals a clear circadian rhythm in the granu-
larity of kτ,ǫ-anonymized data, as well as in the percentage of
suppressed samples. The plots refer to one sample week in the
abi and dak datasets, when τ = 30 min, but consistent results
were observed in all of our reference datasets. Specifically,
8The spurious point at τ = 1 hour in shn is due to the fact that the time
interval τ + ǫ is already very large, at around the same order of magnitude
of the full dataset duration.
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Fig. 9. Time series of spatiotemporal accuracy (a,b) and suppression usage (c) for one sample week in the abi dataset.
the mean spatial granularity, in Fig. 9a, is much finer during
daytime, when subscribers are more active and the volume
of trajectories is larger: here, it is easier to hide a user
into the crowd. Overnight displacements are instead harder
to anonymize, since subscribers are limited in number and
they tend to have diverse patterns. This is also corroborated
by the significantly higher suppression of samples between
midnight and early morning, in Fig. 9c. Time granularity, in
Fig. 9b, is less subject to day-night oscillations: the slightly
higher accuracy recorded at night is an artifact of the important
relative suppression of samples at those times.
5) Summary: Overall, our results show that kte-hide
attains kτ,ǫ-anonymity of real-world datasets of mobile traffic,
while maintaining a remarkable level of accuracy in the data.
Interestingly, its performance is better when most needed, at
daytime, when the majority of human activities take place.
V. RELATED WORK
Protection of individual mobility data has attracted signif-
icant attention in the past decade. However, attack models
and privacy criteria are very specific to the different data
collection contexts. Hence, solutions developed for a specific
type of movement data are typically not reusable in other
environments.
For instance, a vast amount of works have targeted user
privacy in location-based services (LBS). There, the goal is
ensuring that single georeferenced queries are not uniquely
identifiable [25]. This is equivalent to anonymizing each
spatiotemporal sample independently, and a whole other prob-
lem from protecting full trajectories. Even when considering
sequences of queries, the LBS milieu allows pseudo-identifier
replacement, and most solutions rely on this approach, see,
e.g., [26], [27]. If applied to spatiotemporal trajectories, these
techniques would seriously and irreversibly break up trajecto-
ries in time, disrupting data utility.
Another popular context is that of spatial trajectories that do
not have a temporal dimension. The problem of anonymizing
datasets of spatial trajectories has been thoroughly explored
in data mining, and many practical solutions based on gen-
eralization have been proposed, see, e.g., [28]–[31]. Such
solutions are not compatible with or easily extended to the
more complex spatiotemporal data we consider.
Some works explicitly target privacy preservation of spatio-
temporal trajectories. However, the precise context they refer
to makes again all the difference. First, most such solutions
consider scenarios where user movements are sampled at regu-
lar time intervals that are identical for all individuals [32], [33],
or where the number of samples per device is very small [34].
These assumptions hold, e.g., for GPS logs or RFID record,
but not for trajectories recorded by mobile operators: the latter
are irregularly sampled, temporally sparse, and cover long
time periods, which results in at least hundreds of samples
per user. Second, many of the approaches above disrupt
data utility, by, e.g., trimming trajectories [35], or violate
the principles of PPDP, by, e.g., perturbating or permutating
the trajectories [32], [33], or creating fictitious samples [36].
Third, all previous studies aim at attaining k-anonymity of
spatiotemporal trajectories, i.e., they protect the data against
record linkage; this includes recent work specifically tailored
to mobile subscriber trajectory datasets [10]. As explained in
Sec. II, k-anonymity is only a partial countermeasure to attacks
on spatiotemporal trajectories.
Provable privacy guarantees are instead offered by differ-
ential privacy, which commends that the presence of a user’s
data in the published dataset should not change substantially
the output of the analysis, and thus formally bounds the
privacy risk of that user [37]. There have been attempts at
using differential privacy with mobility data. Specifically, it
has been successfully used the in the LBS context, when
publishing aggregate information about the location of a large
number of users, see, e.g., [38]. However, the requirements
of these solutions already become too strong in the case of
individual LBS access data [39]. To address this problem, a
variant of differential privacy, named geo-indistinguishability
has been introduced: it requires that any two locations become
more indistinguishable as they are geographically closer [40].
Practical mechanisms achieve geo-indistinguishability, see,
e.g., [39], [40]. However, all refer to the anonymization of
single LBS queries: as of today, differential privacy and its
derived definitions still appear impractical in the context of
spatiotemporal trajectories.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a first PPDP solution to prob-
abilistic and record linkage attacks against mobile subscriber
trajectory data. To that end, we introduced a novel privacy
model, kτ,ǫ-anonymity, which generalizes the popular criterion
of k-anonymity. Our proposed algorithm, kte-hide, imple-
ments kτ,ǫ-anonymity in real-world datasets, while retaining
substantial spatiotemporal accuracy in the anoymized data.
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